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HOW MUCH ACCESS TO JUSTICE FROM STATE "EQUAL
ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACTS"?
SUSAN M. OLSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Many Americans subscribe to two popular political ideologies:
the antigovernment sentiment that believes an unregulated free mar-
ket is virtually always preferable to government involvement and the
antilitigation sentiment that views our country as imperiled by too
many lawyers and too much litigation. President George Bush's
Counsel on Competitiveness expressed these views when it called for
"unleash[ing] the creative energy and incentives of the free market"
from "regulations that are outdated and unnecessary"' and also rec-
ommended various steps to counter what it perceived as "excessive,
needless litigation."' 2 More recently, the Republicans' 1994 "Contract
with America" included planks calling for both less regulation and
limits on litigation. 3
Although many people subscribe to both ideologies, the two can
easily be in tension with each other. Furthermore, when the two come
head to head, the antigovernment sentiment frequently prevails. Ac-
cording to Robert Kagan, America's widely decried, yet pervasive,
"adversarial legalism" is primarily a function of a political culture that
wants a government that protects its citizens from environmental
harms and injustices, but does not trust concentrated power and thus
divides and checks governmental authority.4 Litigation brought to
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1. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, THE LEGACY OF REGULATORY RE-
FORM: RESTORING AMERICA'S COMPETITIVENESS, at Cover Memorandum (1992).
2. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA, at Cover Memorandum (1991) [hereinafter AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE].
3. See Newt Gingrich et al., Common Sense Legal Reform Act, in CONTRACT WITH
AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994); Newt Gingrich et al., Job Creation and
Wage Enhancement Act, in CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds.,
1994).
4. Robert A. Kagan, Do Lawyers Cause Adversarial Legalism? A Preliminary Inquiry, 19
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1, 7-8 (1994).
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check government wrongdoing and overreaching is a more specific ex-
ample of opposition to government trumping opposition to litigation.
As much as some people say they dislike litigation, those same people
willingly use it to challenge government activity that they dislike even
more.
By facilitating access to the courts to challenge government ac-
tion, Equal Access to Justice Acts (EAJAs) exemplify the predomi-
nance of antigovernment over antilitigation ideology. EAJAs are
statutes in which, under specified circumstances, the government re-
imburses the attorney fees of private parties prevailing in litigation
against it. Their antigovernment ideological thrust is evident in their
origins in the deregulatory climate of the 1980s and their explicit pur-
pose to encourage small businesses to resist governmental actions.
EAJAs are one species of the larger genus of statutes shifting at-
torney fees and other costs of litigation to the opposing party. Along
with other mechanisms that facilitate access to the courts, such as sub-
sidized legal services for the poor, organizational standing to sue,
group legal insurance, lower filing fees or jurisdictional dollar limits,
and citizen standing, fee-shifting statutes have been featured in the
ideological debate over the pros and cons of litigation and the role of
the legal system in American society.
Opinions about these mechanisms turn not just on ideology, of
course, but also on their redistributive implications, and fee-shifting
statutes are explicitly redistributive. Although EAJAs are a small,
and in some ways atypical, subset of fee-shifting statutes, their rela-
tively broad scope makes them significant examples of fee shifting in
operation. EAJAs potentially make more equal the litigation re-
sources of private parties and the government. This Article examines
the extent to which such equalization actually occurs. How much re-
distribution takes place under EAJAs and who benefits from it de-
pend on at least three factors: the terms of the statutes themselves,
who chooses to use them, and how the courts interpret and apply the
statutes in the cases that come before them.
This Article empirically examines the scope and use of state
Equal Access to Justice Acts and compares them to prior research
findings on the federal EAJA.5 Part II puts EAJAs into the larger
context of fee-shifting statutes of all sorts in the United States and the
normative debate about fee shifting. Part III then discusses the his-
5. Susan G. Mezey & Susan M. Olson, Fee Shifting and Public Policy: The Equal Access to
Justice Act, 77 JUDICATURE 13 (1993).
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tory and purposes of EAJAs at the federal and state levels, including
their connection with the deregulation ideology. The types of cases
expected to benefit most from EAJAs are identified. Part IV dis-
cusses the varying characteristics of state EAJAs, emphasizing the
provisions that are most important in determining how many and
what types of claimants will benefit from the laws. Finally, in Part V a
data set of primarily appellate cases applying the state laws reveals the
trends in claims and awards under these laws and compares these
trends with prior research about the federal EAJA.
The study finds that EAJAs have produced a rather modest de-
gree of redistribution of resources from the government to private
parties.6 More because of the fiscal implications of redistribution and
explicit support for government regulation than because of antilitiga-
tion ideology, the EAJAs have been written in ways that limit their
antigovernmental effect. Moreover, the actual beneficiaries of the re-
distribution have differed somewhat from the beneficiaries envisioned
by the laws' deregulatory ideology. The legislative history and statu-
tory language of EAJAs at both the federal and state levels suggest
that their principal intended beneficiary was the small business com-
munity, but most permit individual claimants as well. Where individu-
als are eligible, they bring more EAJA claims than do businesses. On
the other hand, businesses have been more common claimants under
state EAJAs in the aggregate than under the federal EAJA. Thus, use
of state EAJAs is more consistent with the deregulatory ideology than
is use of the federal EAJA, even though most states patterned their
statutes on the federal model.
II. THE STATUS OF FEE SHIFTING IN THE UNITED STATES
Traditionally, the American legal system has operated on the pre-
sumption that both sides in a lawsuit will pay their own litigation costs,
the bulk of which is likely to be attorney fees. This "pay your own
way" procedure is known as the "American rule" because the so-
called "English rule," in which the losing party in a lawsuit pays the
expenses of the winner, is much more common in other Westernized
countries, including Great Britain and the Commonwealth. Although
the American rule goes back at least to the eighteenth century in the
United States, 7 numerous exceptions to it began appearing after 1950,
6. See infra Part V.C.
7. Frances K. Zemans, Fee Shifting and The Implementation of Public Policy, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 187, 188-89 (1984).
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and the rule has been significantly eroded at both the federal and state
levels since 1970.8
A crucial aspect of fee-shifting statutes is the distinction between
one-way and two-way shifts. The English rule is a two-way loser-pays
procedure that, on its face at least, treats most plaintiffs and defend-
ants identically. In the United States, more fee-shifting statutes are
one-way shifts, usually pro-plaintiff, under which a prevailing plaintiff
can collect costs from a losing defendant, but a prevailing defendant
cannot collect from a losing plaintiff. One variant is a two-way shift
with a more difficult standard of recovery for defendants than plain-
tiffs. Federal civil rights actions are the best known example of this
pattern.9 Another variant, which is the focus of study for the present
research, is the one-way shift in litigation against the government, in
which the private party may potentially collect as either plaintiff or
defendant.10
The form that a fee-shifting law takes depends upon its purpose.11
For example, statutes designed to prevent abuse of the judicial system
tend to award fees against either a plaintiff bringing a frivolous claim
or a defendant raising a defense in bad faith. Other two-way statutes
might be intended simply to indemnify a party and enable it to estab-
lish a legal claim without financial burden, as with the English rule. In
contrast, possible purposes of a one-way shift are to equalize the liti-
gation strengths of the parties (as, for example, in divorce cases or
EAJAs) or to encourage litigation because it is perceived as being in
the public interest (another purpose of most EAJAs).
In recent years, debates over fee shifting have moved from the
legal community to the broader political arena. The normative pros
and cons of the English rule had been debated extensively in Ameri-
can legal scholarship even before the dramatic increase in U.S. fee-
8. Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Repealing the American Rule?
47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 321 (1984); see also Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Bridging
the Gap Between Congress and the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and the Erosion of the Amer-
ican Rule Governing Awards of Attorneys' Fees, 38 W. POL. Q. 238 (1985).
9. In Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978), the Supreme Court
set a much higher standard for a prevailing defendant to collect fees in Title VII employment
discrimination cases than it had set for plaintiffs under the same provision in Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). The Court also applied the higher standard to § 1988 defend-
ants in Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14-16 (1980).
10. Although they are included in this study, three state EAJAs are technically two-way
because they authorize judges to award fees to the government from a losing private party if the
latter's position was based on bad faith: HAw. REV. STAT. § 661-12(b) (1995); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-37-104(2)(B) (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.245(11) (1995).
11. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DuKE L.J. 651.
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shifting statutes occurred in the Seventies. 12 A 1984 symposium in
Law & Contemporary Problems documented this increase and ex-
amined it from many angles.13 Vice President Dan Quayle brought
greater popular attention to the subject of fee shifting in August 1991,
when he publicized the proposals of the Council on Competitiveness
for both a two-way "loser-pays" rule for all federal cases based on
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and a moratorium on one-way fee
shifts.14 President Bush's Executive Order 12,77815 implemented
some of the Council's proposals, including a required cost-benefit
analysis of any new federal one-way fee shifts. President Clinton has
not rescinded the order. Proposed federal tort reform legislation in
1995 also included fee shifting among sanctions for frivolous
litigation.16
The normative debate tends to find people divided into two
camps, depending on their view of the proper role of courts and litiga-
tion. On one side are Quayle and others who perceive that Americans
are excessively litigious, 17 and assume that a loser-pays rule would de-
ter frivolous claims. On the other side are persons who focus on those
Americans who are not litigious but, on the contrary, are excluded
from using the legal system because of inability to pay the costs re-
quired.' 8 These persons' support for or opposition to laws that shift
legal fees from one party to another would depend on the likelihood
they would increase "access to justice" for legitimate claims.
Views on one-way fee shifting, even more clearly than those on
two-way fee shifting, reflect controversy about the role of the legal
system in American society. Proponents of pro-plaintiff fee shifting
12. See sources cited in Philip Mause, Winner Takes All: A Re-Examination of the Indem-
nity System, 55 IowA L. REV. 26, 27 (1969).
13. The articles that emphasize one-way shifts and thus are especially relevant to EAJAs
include Bruce Fein, Citizen Suit Attorney Fee Shifting Awards: A Critical Examination of Gov-
ernment-"Subdsidized" Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 211 (1984); Robert V. Percival &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest Litigation, 47 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 233 (1984); Zemans, supra note 7, at 187.
14. AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 24-26.
15. Exec. Order No. 12,778, WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (Oct. 23, 1991).
16. S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
17. See J. Anthony Kline, Law Reform and the Courts: More Power to the People or to the
Profession, 53 CAL. ST. B.J. 14 (1978); Philip Kurland, Government By Judiciary, 2 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 307 (1979); Bayless Manning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U. L.
REV. 767 (1977); Walter K. Olson, System Overload, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 70; Laurence Tribe,
Too Much Law, Too Little Justice: An Argument for Delegalizing America, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1979, at 25;.
18. See, e.g., 1 ACCESS To JUSTICE (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978); Alan M.
Dershowitz, Heroes and Hired Guns, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1991, at 72; Laura Nader & Linda Singer,
Dispute Resolution.... 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 281 (1976).
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tend to see it as increasing access to justice for low- and moderate-
income people or for public interest litigants whose individual finan-
cial stake in a controversy would be too small for them to bear the
costs of litigation personally. 19 Opponents, on the other hand, see
pro-plaintiff fee shifting as encouraging frivolous "nuisance" suits20
and, in the public realm, as just one more step toward removing poli-
cymaking from appropriate decision makers and putting it in the
hands of the judiciary.21
Exactly how much fee shifting takes place in the United States is
difficult to determine. Most of the deviation from the American rule
has come piecemeal, attached to specific pieces of substantive legisla-
tion, rather than as a wholesale shift.22 One authority on fee shifting
identifies 153 federal statutes with one or more fee-shifting provi-
sions.23 At the state level a 1983 survey identified 1,974 laws provid-
ing for some type of fee shifting.24 My update of this survey produced
an estimate that the number of state fee-shifting statutes had almost
doubled to 3,918 as of May, 1993-a remarkable increase in a
decade. 25
For several reasons, however, simply knowing how many statutes
are on the books does not tell much about the amount of fee shifting
actually occurring. First, many fee-shifting provisions are part of laws
that probably do not get frequent use, such as Utah's Motor Fuel Mar-
keting Act, which awards fees to persons injured by the sale of gas
below cost.26 Second, to collect under many fee-shifting statutes, par-
19. Percival & Miller, supra note 13, at 233.
20. See discussion in Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 150-53 (1984).
21. Fein, supra note 13.
22. Zemans, supra note 7, at 205. Alaska is the only state in the United States with the
English rule of general two-way fee shifting. Alaska's Civil Rule 82 provides for the prevailing
party to receive partial attorney's fees from the loser. Although the rule vests discretion in the
trial judge to decide whether to award fees rather than mandating them, the judge may award
them as a matter of course without a motion from the prevailing party. See Virginia Celia Anti-
polo, The Impact of Economic Incentives on the Award of Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Liti-
gation, 1 ALASKA L. REV. 189 (1984); SUSANNE DIPIETRO ET AL., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
ALASKA's ENGLISH RULE: ATrORNEYS' FEE SHrFrING IN CIVIL CASES (1995) (funding provided
by a grant from the State Justice Institute).
23. ALBA CONTE, 2 ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS 321-30 (2d ed. 1993).
24. Note, supra note 8, at 323.
25. This estimate is based on a Lexis search for all fee-shifting statutes in fourteen randomly
selected states. The Lexis search ("litigation expense" or "attorney fees" or "attorney costs" or
"fee shifting" or "equal access to justice" or "fee contracts" w/20 "award" or "reimbursement"
or "reciprocal right" or "restitution" or "entitled") yielded 5,122 references in the fifty states.
Applying the percentage of references eliminated as not fee shifts after they were all looked up
in the fourteen states to the 5,122 produced the total of 3,918. For the fourteen states whose fee-
shifting statutes were coded, more than half were enacted in 1984 or later.
26. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-16-7 (1992).
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ties must meet additional conditions beyond simply prevailing. Many
apply only if the losing party did not just lose, but also acted badly in
some way (e.g., frivolously, maliciously, or without a rational basis).
The burden of proving or disproving such additional conditions may
be given to either party, but is more likely to fall on the winning than
the losing party. Third, although mandatory fee shifts are somewhat
more common, many laws simply authorize the judge to award fees to
the prevailing party. In my survey's sample, 54% of the statutes were
mandatory and 42% discretionary (the remainder being unclear). Be-
cause judges have considerable discretion, even under mandatory fee
shifts, in interpreting whether a party has indeed prevailed and met
any additional conditions, one cannot know how much fee shifting ac-
tually takes place without a detailed study of case outcomes.
Despite these limitations on what one can learn from statutes
alone, the distribution of types of fee shifts tells something about who
is supposed to benefit from them. Pro-plaintiff statutes predominate
at the state level.27 The 1983 state survey found 54.4% of fee shifts
benefit the prevailing plaintiff, 8.4% the prevailing defendant, and
23% the prevailing or "either" party.28 The same survey found an
additional 1.5% of statutes to have differential standards tilting in
favor of the plaintiff.29
In my more recent state survey, I found that one-way, pro-plain-
tiff statutes still prevail. They make up 52.5% of fee-shifting laws,
compared to 7.9% one-way, pro-defendant statutes (e.g., eminent do-
main and prisoner litigation) and 37.6% two-way shifts. 30 Among the
two-way statutes, 16.7% have standards favoring the plaintiff and
0.8% have standards favoring the defendant. Thus, only 30.9% of the
statutes are even-handed, two-way shifts. Furthermore, the vast ma-
27. They apparently do at the federal level as well. Harold J. Krent, Explaining One-Way
Fee Shifting, 79 VA. L. REV. 2039, 2041 (1993) cites a Congressional Research Service report
saying there are over one hundred one-way federal shifts, which would be a majority of federal
fee shifts.
28. Note, supra note 8, at 330, tbl. 2. Since this survey apparently created a new category
for each variation in statutory language, almost 15% of statutes fall into a variety of small
categories.
29. Id. at 333, tbl. 4.
30. The remaining almost 2% are "other one-way" shifts, including shifts to third parties
such as "personal representatives" in probate actions or interpleaders and shifts to persons
deemed inherently disadvantaged against more powerful parties whether plaintiff or defendant
(e.g., employees in workers compensation cases, wives in one divorce statute, and private parties
litigating against the government).
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jority of these are discretionary, not mandatory.31 In fact, mandatory,
two-way statutes with the same standard of review for both sides
make up only 6.0% of the total sample, and a substantial number of
these appear to be intended to deter abuse of the judicial process (e.g.,
frivolous claims or defenses, or discovery abuse) more than to indem-
nify parties.
In short, the English rule has not made much headway in the
United States. Other fee shifting has become quite common, how-
ever. Despite the normative debates about the merits of fee shifting,
there have been few empirical studies of its actual use.32 This study of
state EAJAs adds some such empirical evidence.
III. HISTORY AND PURPOSES OF EQUAL ACCESS TO
JUSTICE ACTS
In 1980 the federal government passed the Equal Access to Jus-
tice Act,33 which waives the government's general immunity from
awards of attorney fees and affirmatively authorizes an award of fees
to certain private parties prevailing against it in non-tort civil litiga-
tion34 or adversarial administrative adjudications.35 Reversing the
classic pattern of federalism in which states act as laboratories for fed-
eral policy, many states followed the federal lead.36 Within a decade
31. The discretionary, two-way shifts include laws where a party does not even have to
prevail to receive fees, such as those authorizing judges in divorce cases to require the wealthier
party to pay the other's fees.
32. These include, on one-way shifts: Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining
Constitutional Tort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as
Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 719 (1988); on two-way shifts: Don L. Coursey & Linda R.
Stanley, Pretrial Bargaining Behavior within the Shadow of the Law: Theory and Experimental
Evidence, 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1988); Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litiga-
tion and Settlement: An Empirical Approach, 71 REV. ECON. & STAT. 189 (1989); Edward A.
Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts
Theory, 6 J.L. ECON., & ORGANIZATION 345 (1990); and on offers of judgment: Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr. & Neil Vidmar, Empirical Research on Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report, 51
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13 (1988).
33. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1994).
36. Before the federal EAJA, Oregon had passed a vague, discretionary provision for attor-
ney fees following judicial review of administrative decisions in 1975 (OR. REV. STAT. § 183.495
(1981) (repealed 1985)). In 1981 it was supplemented by two new provisions, § 183.497 and
§ 182.090, which are more similar to the federal EAJA. Section 183.495 was repealed in 1985.
Montana also passed its law, MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711 (1993), a year before the federal
version, but Congress had begun having hearings on expanding federal liability for attorney fees
in 1977 (H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980)). The American Bar Association had
also proposed governmental assumption of private parties' fees in 1978. See Zemans, supra note
7, at 206. It is perhaps not coincidental that Montana is one of only two states with a stricter
standard for recovery than the federal EAJA.
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twenty-nine states had somewhat similar laws on their books.37 After
a six-year hiatus in new EAJAs, Washington state adopted one in
1995.38 Table 1 lists these thirty statutes, the year of their passage, and
some measures of use.39
The passage of legislation can be viewed either in self-interested,
public-choice terms of who directly benefits from the legislation or in
more public-regarding terms. From the former perspective, research
on the legislative history of the federal EAJA found that it was a
product of the deregulatory climate of the early 1980s, passed largely
at the instigation of small businesses to help them defend themselves
against allegedly unreasonable government regulation.40 Executive
branch agencies opposed the legislation because they feared it would
inhibit needed regulatory enforcement and because of the legislation's
projected costs. Initially, liberal interest groups such as the Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, the American Civil Liberties
Union, and the Council for Public Interest Law also opposed the bill
because of its anticipated effect on regulatory enforcement. By the
time the law was permanently reauthorized in 1985, however, liberal
groups joined the small business lobbyists in support because they had
learned it could be useful for them, too.41 In theory, EAJA opponents
could have invoked the antilitigation ideology, but being court-users
themselves, they did not do so. Thus, antigovernment ideology was
the terrain on which the battle over passage was fought.
What evidence is available on the state EAJAs' legislative histo-
ries suggests that they were passed for much the same purposes as the
federal EAJA. Many of the state laws reflect the antiregulatory, pro-
business slant even more strongly than the federal law. Nine states'
EAJAs allow only businesses or persons licensed by the state to make
37. Several states also adopted the title of Equal Access to Justice Act: hence the acronym
"EAJA" to refer to such laws generically.
38. 1995 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 403, § 901-905, 1516, 1548 (West), to be codified at WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 4.84.902-905 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996).
39. My sources for identifying these state EAJAs were several journal articles-Christo-
pher J. Costantini & Michael J. Skindell, Fee Shifting in Ohio: An Overview of Ohio's Version of
the Equal Access to Justice Act, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 201 (1989); Andrea Saltzman, A Brief Look
at Statutory Attorneys' Fees in Illinois, 73 ILL. B.J. 266 (1985); Samuel A. Thumma & Barbara J.
Dawson, The Iowa Equal Access to Justice Act: Is Recovery Available?, 39 DRAKE L. REV. 431
(1989-90); Dirk A. Williams, ". . . And Attorney Fees to the Prevailing Party": Recovering Fees
Under Montana Statutory Law, 46 MONT. L. REV. 119 (1985); Symposium, Utah Legislative Sur-
vey, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 115 -and a review of the entries under Attorney Fees in the index
volumes of the remaining state codes.
40. Mezey & Olson, supra note 5, at 15.
41. Social Security claimants were the predominant users of the federal EAJA during the
1980s. Id. at 16-18.
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claims but not other individual claimants, whom the federal EAJA
does include.42 The role in lobbying for the law played by the Na-
tional Federation of Independent Businesses, which was also a major
supporter at the federal level, can be documented in at least one
state.4
3
Regardless of who lobbied for the laws, the alternative, public-
regarding reasons for the passage of EAJA are articulated in formal
statements of legislative findings. Several states' legislative findings
are taken almost verbatim from their federal counterpart, to the effect
that certain parties (they vary on who this is) "may be deterred from
seeking review of or defending against unreasonable [or "substantially
unjustified"] governmental action because of the expense involved in
securing the vindication of their rights." 44
In his study of one-way fee shifting, Harold Krent breaks down
the more public-regarding reasons for the passage of a one-way an-
tigovernment shift into three potential public policy justifications: as-
sisting the legislative branch in monitoring agency behavior, deterring
agency wrongdoing, and more fully compensating victims of govern-
ment wrongdoing. 45 Deterrence potentially occurs due to both the in-
creased judicial review and the cost of paying attorney fee awards.
The monitoring function comes about by providing persons with in-
centives to resist and thus increase the visibility of arguably inappro-
priate agency behavior, when such resistance would not occur without
42. This is true of the statutes in California, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Tennessee, Texas, and Utah. Indiana, Minnesota, and Tennessee also include small or tax-ex-
empt organizations. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1028.5 (West 1981); FLA. STAr. ANN. § 57.111
(West 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-12 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-36-5(4) (West 1994); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:965.1 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.471 (Subd. 6) (West 1994);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-37-103 (1994); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2006.013, .014 (West 1995);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27a-1, -4, -5 (1995). For small or tax exempt organizations, see IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-2-36-5(4)(B) (West 1994); MIN. STAT. ANN. § 15.471 (Subd. 6) (West 1994);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-37-103(B) (1994).
43. Discussed in McMains v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 409 N.W.2d 911 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
44. Compare the federal statement of findings and purpose (Title II of Pub. L. No. 96-481,
94 Stat. 2325 (1980)) to those in the following statutes: 1981 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS ch. 208 §§ 1, 3;
FLA. STAT. ANN. 57.111(2) (West 1994); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2031 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-27a-2 (1995); 1995 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. ch. 403 § 901 (West). Rhode Island's statement of
purpose is more elaborate. It notes the "tremendous power" of the state and finds this "often
tempts state agencies to proceed against individuals or small businesses which are least able to
contest the agency's actions," which are often not "in the best interest of the public. ...
[C]ontesting an unjust agency action" is "an important service to the public." R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-92-1(a), (b) (1994).
45. See Krent, supra note 27.
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incentives. Equalizing the strength of the litigating parties is in this
way a byproduct of the monitoring function.46
Krent applies these three purposes to the federal EAJA and finds
that the goals of deterrence and compensation are probably not very
well served by the law. 47 Some equalization of the parties and addi-
tional incentives to resist agency action are achieved, however, espe-
cially for certain types of cases. Drawing upon Thomas Rowe's
theoretical work,48 Krent expects the federal EAJA to be most suc-
cessful at encouraging three types of claims: first, strong but small
monetary claims in which the cost of litigating would otherwise swamp
the amount won; second, nonmonetary claims; and third, targets of
government enforcement efforts.49 Litigants in these types of cases
have little prospect of obtaining counsel on a contingent basis.50
Krent argues further that providing incentives to litigate is especially
important in cases initiated by the government because other means
of oversight are greater for policymaking decisions within the bureau-
cracy, such as rulemaking, than for case-specific, policy implementa-
tion decisions, such as regulatory enforcement actions.51
46. Harold J. Krent, Fee Shifting Under the Equal Access to Justice Act-A Qualified Suc-
cess, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 458, 462 (1993).
47. Id. at 476, 478.
48. Rowe, supra note 20, at 142. The application of theoretical models to the subject of
attorney fees dates to the burgeoning of the law and economics movement in the 1970s. See
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977). Despite the relative scarcity
of true two-way, English rule statutes in the United States, however, scholarly theoretical and
empirical literature has focused heavily on this variation from the American rule rather than the
more common one-way shift. For a summary of the law-and-economics literature, including a
brief discussion of attorney fee shifting, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic
Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1082-84 (1989).
Important exceptions that do discuss one-way shifts, however, include, in addition to Rowe,
supra note 20, Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alterna-
tive Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982) in the theoretical
literature and Schwab and Eisenberg, supra note 32, in the empirical literature.
49. Krent, supra note 46, at 465.
50. Both contingent fees and one-way, pro-plaintiff statutes can be seen as vehicles for shift-
ing risk away from plaintiffs. According to Gregory C. Sisk, The Essentials of the Equal Access
to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable Government Conduct (Part
One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217, 246 (1994), "Congress chose to exclude tort cases from the scope of
the [federal] EAJA because it believed alternative fee payment methods, such as contingency fee
arrangements, were adequate to ensure that injured persons could obtain legal representation to
seek redress for torts committed by government employees or entities." One-way fee shifting is
presumably more favorable to winning plaintiffs than contingent fees because their attorney fees
would be paid by their opponent rather than coming out of their award. On the other hand,
unless the two systems were combined, plaintiffs bear fewer up-front costs with contingent fees
than with fee-shifting (see Zemans, supra note 7, at 201). Moreover, losing plaintiffs would have
to pay their attorneys themselves under a one-way shift, while the attorney would absorb the loss
with a contingent fee agreement.
51. Krent, supra note 46, at 462-63.
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The pattern of use of the federal EAJA to a large extent supports
Krent's theoretical expectations, although not exactly in the way Con-
gress expected. Mezey and Olson found that in the Eighties the fed-
eral EAJA was very successfully used by Social Security disability
claimants whose benefits were terminated. 52 These cases fit two of
Krent's categories: the parties had small but strong monetary claims
and were on the defensive against government action. In contrast, the
small business parties, at whose urging Congress had passed the law,
had used it relatively little.
This Article surveys state EAJAs to examine their redistributive
effects by identifying who is using them for what types of issues. Fur-
thermore, it seeks to compare their usage to that of the federal EAJA
and to determine if business parties and challenges to government
regulations are more prevalent under state EAJAs. The pattern of
use will also be compared to two of the categories for which Krent
expects EAJAs to be most useful: cases defending against govern-
ment-initiated action, and nonmonetary claims.53 Because the
amount of redistribution that actually occurs under EAJAs and the
identity of beneficiaries depend on the terms of the statutes them-
selves, who chooses to use them, and how they are interpreted and
applied by courts in cases that come to them, each of these will be
examined in turn.
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE EAJAs: THE STATUTES
Before discussing the considerable variation in state EAJAs, it is
necessary to establish the essential characteristics of a statute that
qualify it as an EAJA. Most states and the federal government have
enacted various laws that shift fees to the government in suits under
particular causes of action.54 In contrast, EAJAs are free-standing
laws that apply to a wide range of substantive actions. The key provi-
sions of state EAJAs reimburse the attorney fees of persons who suc-
cessfully appeal decisions of administrative agencies. 55 Many also
52. Mezey & Olson, supra note 5, at 17-18. These cases that flooded into the federal courts
in the mid-1980s were ideal candidates for EAJA claims because the courts widely viewed the
terminations as not substantially justified.
53. Krent's other category, strong but small monetary claims, could not be studied because
of insufficient information about the size of claims.
54. See, e.g., UTAH CODE AN. § 13-16-7 (1992); see also supra text accompanying note 26
(discussing the Motor Fuel Marketing Act).
55. Some also cover administrative proceedings even if they have not been appealed, but
this Article concerns only fees in cases that have reached the judiciary. At least one state,
Michigan, has a fee shift for administrative procedures, but not for judicial proceedings (MICH.
CoMP. LAWS § 24.323 (1984)).
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cover civil actions other than appeals of administrative decisions, es-
pecially if the state initiates the action.56
Furthermore, EAJAs apply only to litigation with the govern-
ment, not between private parties. Thus I exclude two-way fee shifts
penalizing all frivolous litigation, even if they are expressly applied to
government as well as private litigants. Although I discuss EAJAs as
one-way, antigovernment shifts, three states' laws are technically two-
way shifts. The laws of Hawaii, Tennessee, and Wisconsin do permit
the government to collect from private parties but under a more diffi-
cult standard, i.e., only if the case was frivolous or brought in bad
faith.57 These states' laws are included in the discussion that follows.
In general, EAJAs are far from being automatic fee shifts for par-
ties prevailing in litigation with state governments, but their restric-
tions vary from state to state. They differ in the parties eligible to
make claims under them, the types of legal actions covered and who
must initiate the action, the governmental units covered, their
mandatory or discretionary nature, the amount of fees recoverable,
and the standard required to recover.5 8
The majority of the thirty states' EAJAs have some limits on
party eligibility. Nine state EAJAs are restricted to businesses or
licensees and include limits on the size of eligible businesses.5 9 These
statutes reflect the pro-small business legislative origins of the federal
EAJA more clearly than does the federal law itself, which permits in-
dividual as well as business claimants.60 Of the states that include in-
dividuals and businesses, eleven have no limits on the wealth or size of
eligible parties;61 ten have such restrictions.62 Limits for individuals
56. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
57. HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-12(b) (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-37-104(2)(B) (1994); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 814.245(11) (West 1994). In addition, Ky. REV. STAT. Arm. § 453.260 (Baldwin
1995) and Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.087 (Vernon 1994) are written in terms of "prevailing parties"
without language that explicitly excludes the state from collecting, but the conditions for receiv-
ing fees make sense only for private parties. Thus, I consider them one-way statutes.
58. Other ways in which the statutes vary, not discussed here, are whether fees are awarded
for administrative as well as judicial proceedings, standards for prevailing (e.g., with respect to
remands or settlements), and procedural requirements for making claims. All of these also po-
tentially affect the likelihood of an award.
59. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1028.5 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111 (West 1994);
HAw. REV. STAT. § 661-12 (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-36-5 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 49:965.1 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.471. (West 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-
37-103, -104 (1994); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2006.013, .014 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§ 78-27a-1, -4, -5 (1995). Three of these also include small tax exempt organizations: IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-2-36-5(4)(B) (West 1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.471 (Subd. 6) (West 1994); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 29-37-103(B) (1994).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1994).
61. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(B) (1995); IDAHO CODE § 12-117 (1994); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 5, para. 100/10-55 (Smith-Hurd 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260 (Baldwin 1995);
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range from New York's very low $50,000 net worth63 (the next lowest
is Wisconsin's $150,000 annual income64 or Rhode Island's $250,000
net worth 65) to Missouri's $2 million net worth.66 For businesses, eligi-
bility limits range from Iowa's low of no more than twenty employees
and $1 million in annual gross receipts 67 to Missouri's high of 500 em-
ployees and $7 million net worth.68 Clearly, many more parties are
eligible claimants in some states than others.
As noted earlier, all state EAJAs apply to successful appeals of
administrative agency decisions.69 Arizona, Iowa, Kentucky, Penn-
sylvania, and South Carolina, however, exempt specified types of ad-
ministrative decisions, such as rate-fixing proceedings, which all five
exclude.70 In some instances these are substantial exclusions. For ex-
ample, Pennsylvania excludes all, and South Carolina some, licensing
proceedings, 71 which are an important type of business regulation and
generate a sizable number of cases in other states. Pennsylvania also
excludes public employees' dismissals or suspensions, which again are
generally a significant source of cases. Perhaps most significantly, Ar-
izona, Iowa, and Kentucky exclude proceedings to determine eligibil-
ity or entitlement to a monetary benefit. 72 Appeals from denials or
terminations of public assistance and unemployment benefits are
MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-19.1 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-
32-21.1 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 941 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 182.090 (1994);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-300 (Law. Co-op. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:21 (Michie 1994).
62. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-184a(a)(1) (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 625.29(2)
(West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.085(2) (Vernon 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1804 (1994);
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 8602(d) (McKinney 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2335.39(A)(2)
(Anderson 1994); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2032 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-2(d) (1994); WASH.
REV. CODE Ar. § 4.84.340(5) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 814.245(2), (8)
(West 1994).
63. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 8602(d) (McKinney 1994).
64. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 814.245(8) (West 1994).
65. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-2(d) (1994).
66. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.085(2)(a) (Vernon 1994).
67. IOWA CODE ANN. § 625.29(2)(b) (West 1995).
68. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.085(2)(b) (Vernon 1994).
69. The Illinois law, however, is limited to cases in which an administrative rule is invali-
dated. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 100/10-55(c) (Smith-Hurd 1995).
70. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(H)(1) (1995); IOWA CODE AN. § 625.29(1)(d) (West
1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(5)(a) (Baldwin 1995); 71 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2032 (1995);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-300 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
71. For Pennsylvania, see 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2032 (1995); for South Carolina, S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-77-300 (Law. Co-op. 1993).
72. For Arizona, see ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(H)(1) (1995); for Iowa, IOWA CODE
ANN. § 625.29(1)(d) (West 1995); and, for Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(5)(a)
(Baldwin 1995).
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among the most common cases in other states.73 To exclude such
cases disadvantages the most needy citizens. 74
In addition to covering administrative appeals, the majority of
state EAJAs cover at least some civil actions not originating in admin-
istrative agencies. In only five states (Idaho, Montana, New York,
North Carolina, and Oregon), however, is the language so broad as to
cover most actions a private party might initiate against the state. 75
Most either are limited to certain types of actions or cover only suc-
cessful defenses of civil actions initiated by the state.
Who initiates the action in an administrative proceeding is also an
issue in some states. Seven states limit coverage to administrative
proceedings initiated by the state.76 Sometimes this is interpreted ex-
tremely restrictively to mean initiating the litigation itself and not the
underlying dispute. Ohio courts, for example, have denied fees on
this ground to a person successfully appealing a decision of the Unem-
ployment Compensation Board of Review to cancel unemployment
benefits and require repayment of them, and to another person ob-
taining reinstatement following termination from a state job. 77
Like the rules on types of actions covered, rules about initiation
of the controversy can also have class implications. For example, Ken-
tucky's statute generally covers civil actions and judicial review of ad-
ministrative decisions only if the legal action or administrative action
was initiated by the state. The one exception is that the law covers
civil actions brought by a private party if the action is to challenge
taxes.78 Those with the highest tax liabilities are potentially eligible
for fee awards, since Kentucky's law also covers both businesses and
individuals and has no upper size or wealth limits. 79
Another feature of the statutes, the number of units of govern-
ment whose actions are covered, has great influence on how many
73. See infra tbl. 2.
74. Low-income citizens often have some access to assistance via legal aid societies, but
such resources are quite limited.
75. IDAHO CODE § 12-117 (1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711 (1994); N.Y. CIv. PRAC.
L. & R. 8602(a) (McKinney 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-19.1 (1994); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 182.090(1), (3) (1994).
76. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111(3)(b) (West 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(1)(c)
(Baldwin 1995); OmHo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2335.39(B)(1)(c), (B)(2) (Anderson 1994); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 941(A), (B) (West 1995); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2033(a) (1995); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. §§ 2006.013, -014 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27a-4, -5 (1995).
77. Estate of Kirby v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, 604 N.E.2d 1367 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1992); Costa v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 578 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989).
78. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(1)(a)-(c) (Baldwin 1995).
79. See id. § 453.260.
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cases potentially arise. This also varies greatly from state to state.
The broadest statutes apply to all state entities and political subdivi-
sions. More limited EAJAs exclude political subdivisions, legislative
and judicial branches, and/or a few named agencies. The narrowest
apply only to state regulatory agencies or those authorized by law to
make rules or decide contested cases.
Although there are always issues of interpretation requiring judi-
cial discretion even when laws are phrased in mandatory terms, pre-
sumably more parties will receive fee awards if they are mandatory
than if they are discretionary. Nineteen states phrase their laws in
mandatory terms, stating that courts "shall" make awards when claim-
ants meet the specified conditions. 80 Two of the nineteen states,
North Dakota and Oregon, authorize discretionary awards when the
conditions for a mandatory award are not met.81 Eleven other states
merely authorize courts to make awards at their discretion when con-
ditions are met.82
Yet another feature, caps on fees, makes some statutes poten-
tially less redistributive than others. Thirteen states' laws provide for
payment of "reasonable" attorney fees,83 which raises many complex
issues about how to calculate what is reasonable,84 but puts no extrin-
sic limit on them. In contrast, the other seventeen states specify a cap
80. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(A) (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-12(a), (b) (1994);
IDAHO CODE § 12-117(1), (2) (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 625.29(1) (West 1995); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 453.260(1) (Baldwin 1995); MINN. STAT. Am. § 15.472(a) (West 1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 536.087(1), (2) (Vernon 1994); Mor. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
1803(1) (1994); N.Y. Civ. PR c. L. & R. 8601(a) (McKinney 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-
21.1(1) (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2335.39(B)(1) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 941(A) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 182.090(1) (1994); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2033(a)
(1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-92-3(a) (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:21(A) (Michie 1995);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.350(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.245(3)
(West 1994).
81. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-21.1(1) (1995) and OR. REV. STAT. § 183.497 (1994).
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1028.5(a) (West 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-184a(b)
(West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111(4)(d) (West 1994); ILIL ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 100/10-
55(b) (Smith-Hurd 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-36-5 (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 49:965.1 (West 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 6-19.1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-300 (Law. Co-
op. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-37-104(a)(1), (b) (1994); TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. § 2006.013
(West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27a-4 (1995).
83. IDAHO CODE § 12-117(1) (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 5, para. 100/10-55(a) (Smith-Hurd
1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 625.28(1) (West 1995); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711(1) (1994);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1802(1) (1994); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. 8601(a) (McKinney 1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 6-19.1 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-21.1(1) (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 941(A) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 182.090(1) (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-77-300 (Law.
Co-op. 1993); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2006.013(a) (West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-
6.14:21(A) (Michie 1995). It is certainly possible that some of these states have established fee
caps by court rule.
84. See generally, Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorney's Fees Against the Fed-
eral Government, 25 ARiz. ST. L.J. 733, 745-69 (1993).
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in the statutes themselves, most commonly $75 per hour and/or a total
amount of $7500 (in ten states) or $10,000 (in six states).85 Again, one
state caters to its taxpayers. Arizona permits fees of $100 per hour for
tax challenges, but only $75 per hour for other actions.86 Only four
states (Arizona, Kentucky, Washington, and Wisconsin) provide statu-
torily for cost of living increases since the laws were passed, and only
one more (Ohio) provides a general exception for a higher rate ap-
proved by the court.87
More than any other feature of the statutes discussed thus far,
what probably contributes most to making the laws difficult to use
successfully is the standard required to recover. In all states but one,
Arizona, parties cannot collect if they merely prevail, but only if the
government conduct was wrongful.88 The most common standards re-
quire proof that the government's position either "lacked a reasonable
basis [both in law and fact]" or was not "substantially justified." The
U.S. Supreme Court has deemed the two standards to be equivalent in
the context of the federal EAJA.89 The federal statute uses the latter
phrasing, where it was crafted as a compromise between a fee shift
only if "bad faith" were proved and a shift for any prevailing litigant.90
Two state EAJAs (Montana and Texas) use the even more difficult
standard of bad faith, groundless, or frivolous.91
85. For $75.00 per hour caps see: Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(E)(2)-(5) (1995); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 661-12(c) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.085(4) (Vernon 1994); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 2335.39(A)(3) (Anderson 1994); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2032(2) (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-92-2(e)(1) (1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.245(5)(a)(2) (West 1994). For $7500 total caps
see: CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1028.5(b) (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-184a(a)(2)
(West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:965.1(D)(1) (West 1995). For $10,000 total fee caps see:
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(E)(2)-(5) (1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-36-7 (West 1994); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(4)(c) (Baldwin 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-37-104(a)(2)(A)
(1994); 71 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 2032(2) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27a-3(2) (1995). Two stat-
utes with higher caps are FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111(4)(d)(2) (West 1994) and MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.471(Subd. 5c) (West 1994).
86. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(E)(2)-(5) (1995).
87. Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(E)(2) (1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(4)(b)
(Baldwin 1995); OHIO REV, CODE ANN. § 2335.39(A)(3) (Anderson 1994); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.84.340(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 814.245(5)(a)(2) (West 1994).
Again, it is possible that in other states these issues are addressed by court rule.
88. Under OR. REV. STAT. § 183.497 (1994) and N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-21.1 (1995),
judges "may" award fees if the standard for a mandatory award is not met.
89. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 522 (1988). Only OR. REV, STAT. § 183.497 (1994) con-
tains both standards and implies that they are different.
90. Mezey & Olson, supra note 5, at 15.
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-10-711(1)(b) (1994); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 2006.011(1),
.013(a)(3) (West 1995).
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In at least five states, 92 the difficulty of meeting this standard is
reduced somewhat by putting the burden of proof on the government
to show that its conduct was substantially justified, as is true under the
federal EAJA.93 Explicit information about who bears the burden is
not available for most states, but presumably unless otherwise stated,
the claimant bears the burden.
With all these restrictions that reduce the ability of many prevail-
ing parties to qualify for an award of attorney fees, it is not surprising
that most of the laws have not been heavily used. I turn next to what
data are available about their use.
V. AMOUNT AND PATTERNS OF USE
A. Method of Data Collection
Rigorous testing of the theoretical literature comparing litigation
activity under the American rule and one-way fee shifting would re-
quire equivalent data under the two cost-allocation methods. Unfor-
tunately, in addition to all the problems associated with identifying a
research setting that minimizes differences other than the fee arrange-
ment, comprehensive data about claims under the state EAJAs are
virtually impossible to obtain. Thirteen of the statutes require that
reports of any claims paid be given to some legislative or administra-
tive office.94 Such a requirement is consistent with the purpose Krent
identifies of aiding the legislature in monitoring agency behavior.95
Nevertheless, inquiries to these offices yielded no information about
awards under their EAJAs from all but four states. A few of the of-
fices had never heard of the laws. Other attempts to obtain more
thorough data from the states themselves also proved fruitless. 96
92. Florida: Department of Professional Regulation, Div. of Real Estate v. Toledo Realty,
Inc., 549 So. 2d 715 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(2)(d)
(Baldwin 1995); Missouri: Melahn v. Otto, 836 S.W.2d 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Ohio: Oio
REV. CODE ANN. § 2335.39(B)(2) (Anderson 1994); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. §§ 182.090(2),
183.497(1)(b) (1994).
93. H.R. REP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess. 18 (1980).
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1028.5(h) (West 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 661-12(e) (1994);
IDAHO CODE § 12-117(3) (1994); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-2-36-9 (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 625.29(7) (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49:965.1(C) (West 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 536.087(7) (Vernon 1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1806 (1994); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 8604
(McKinney 1994); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2034(c), (d) (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-37-104(e)
(1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.84.360 (West 1988 & Supp. 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 814.245(10) (West 1985). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111(7) (repealed 1995). Ironically,
Florida is one of the four states that responded with data when asked in 1994.
95. Krent, supra note 27.
96. I also contacted court administrators to inquire whether court records could identify
claims under their respective EAJAs. None of these inquiries proved fruitful. Letters to state
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Consequently, the principal data source for the study is a Lexis
search of judicial references under the statutory citation for each
state's EAJA through June 30, 1995, as well as the statutory annota-
tions in the printed volumes. In all but three states (Connecticut, New
York, and one case in Ohio) this produced only appellate cases. These
data undoubtedly understate the number of EAJA claims. Data from
the four states (Arizona, Florida, New York, and Wisconsin) that sent
specific information for a year or two worth of claims reveal a few
claims being paid that do not get reported in the appellate cases.
The Lexis cases probably also understate somewhat the success of
EAJA claims.97 Initial decision makers more often deny fees than
award them because of all the restrictions just discussed. Although in
most states the agencies can appeal awards of fees against them, pri-
vate parties denied fees probably have more incentive to appeal than
the agencies do in the relatively few the agencies lose.98 If so, fee
denials are appealed at a higher rate than cases granting fees. Assum-
ing appellate courts uphold trial courts more often than they overturn
them, given normal standards of appellate review, the majority of ini-
tial denials are probably upheld.99 Thus, the data presented here
should be interpreted with caution and are not a definitive account of
the use of state EAJAs. They are, however, the best data available on
an important subject.
B. Patterns of Claims
A total of 340 appellate (plus fifteen trial) cases were reported in
Lexis through June 30, 1995. As Table 1 reveals, the use of state
EAJAs varies dramatically from state to state. Arizona has far more
claims than any other state, notwithstanding its restrictions on types of
claims covered. This suggests that the lack of a "substantially justi-
Attorneys General, who often defend the states in such actions, produced few responses and
nothing but a little anecdotal data. In a number of states, court record keeping or state legal
representation or both are not centralized, so information of this sort would have to be obtained
from each local court or each state agency.
97. Use of federal EAJA cases from Lexis by Mezey and Olson, supra note 5, at 16, tended
to understate claimants' success, compared to data from the Administrative Office of the Courts
and from the Social Security Administration itself. The reported cases understated the domi-
nance of Social Security claims, which have the highest success rate, Krent, supra note 46, at 487,
but also appear to have understated the success of other types of claims, id. at 485.
98. But see Stephen E. Blackman, Bad Faith and the EAJA: A Proposal for Strict Scrutiny
of Government Fee Litigation under the EAJA, 20 ENvTL. L. 975 (1990) (discussing the federal
EAJA).
99. There may also be systematic differences in what cases are deemed sufficiently impor-
tant to report. See generally Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Pub-
lished Cases: A Research Note, 15 JUST. Sys. J. 782 (1992).
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fled"' 0 0 clause or a similar standard is the most important determinant
of an EAJA's attractiveness to claimants. Oregon also stands out as
having the second highest total, but it had an antigovernment fee shift
four years earlier than any other state and a decade earlier than some.
No other state has more than twenty-one reported cases in all the
years since the statute went into effect. The states with the highest
proportion of EAJA cases are the small-caseload states of North Da-
kota, Idaho, and Montana.
Especially when compared to its overall level of appellate filings,
the state of California stands out for its small number of EAJA cases.
At the extreme are four states in which the laws apparently go com-
pletely unused. No Lexis citations were found for the statutes in Ha-
waii, Indiana, Tennessee, and Utah. Moreover, the Attorneys
General in all four states noted that they were unaware of any use of
the statutes.' 0 ' One begins to suspect that at least in some states the
passage of such statutes was purely an exercise in symbolic politics.10 2
1. The No-Use States: Hawaii, Indiana, Tennessee, and Utah
It is tempting to try to determine if some features of the statutes
are more "fatal" to their use than other features. The types of actions
and units of government included in the four states' laws vary widely.
A more consistent feature is that the laws in three of the four no-use
states provide for discretionary, rather than mandatory, awards. On
the other hand, nine other discretionary statutes have generated cases.
The only feature characteristic of all four no-use states is that
only businesses (and not individuals) are eligible to make claims. The
size limits on eligible businesses are quite low, too, ranging from thirty
employees in Tennessee to 250 in Utah. On the other hand, four other
states that exclude individual claimants (California, Florida, Louisi-
ana, and Minnesota) have had cases. Florida, the state with the tight-
est eligibility limits (only businesses with no more than twenty-five
employees and $2 million net worth), has the most reported cases of
these four, many in the area of professional licensing. Still, when ad-
justed for total appellate filings, California, Florida, and Louisiana
100. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
101. Letter from Charles F. Fell, Deputy Attorney General, State of Hawaii, to Susan M.
Olson (Jan. 11, 1995); Letter from Anne P. Mullin, Deputy Attorney General, State of Indiana,
to Susan M. Olson (Aug. 3, 1994); Letter from Andy D. Bennett, Associate Chief Deputy Attor-
ney General, State of Tennessee, to Susan M. Olson (May 9, 1994); Telephone Interview with
Richard C. North, Legislative Research Analyst, State of Utah (Oct. 15, 1993).
102. See generally MURRAY EDELMAN, PoLrrncs AS SYMBOLIc ACTION: MASS AROUSAL
AND QUIESCENCE (1971).
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tend to have fewer EAJA cases than those states that permit claims
from individuals. 10 3
Thus, it is not really possible to determine that any particular
characteristic of the statutes themselves is likely to deter claims, but
presumably a combination of limiting conditions tends to do so. No
doubt factors other than the characteristics of the statutes also play a
role, such as the vigor of regulatory activities in the state and simply
how well known the EAJA statute is.10
2. States with Reported EAJA Cases
Restrictions in the statutes, level of governmental activity, and
awareness of the EAJA obviously influence how many claims arise in
a state as well as whether any claims at all arise. With states where
there has been reported use of the statutes, however, one can compare
the pattern of claims made and their success rates with data for cases
under the federal EAJA and with the kinds of cases for which Krent
says EAJAs are most valuable.
Table 2 displays each state that has had any EAJA cases reported
in Lexis, the total number of those cases, the stakes in the underlying
litigation (monetary or nonmonetary), the types of parties in the case,
the party that initiated the case (government or private party), the
type of underlying cases from which the EAJA claim arose, and the
outcome of the fee claim.10 5 All cases are appellate decisions except
for a few in Connecticut, New York, and Ohio. The trial court deci-
sions are included in the discussion that follows unless otherwise
noted.
The categories of parties and claims used in Mezey and Olson's
study of the federal EAJA are adopted here. 1°6 Types of parties in-
clude individuals, businesses, associations, unions, and governmental
entities. Among the types of claims, challenges to government regula-
103. In addition, two of the three states with two-way shifts are among the four with no use
reported in Lexis. On the other hand, the third state with a two-way shift, Wisconsin, has four-
teen reported cases. Moreover, if a two-way shift were viewed as a serious risk for private par-
ties litigating against state government, it would presumably deter the underlying substantive
litigation and not just claims under the fee statute.
104. See generally Susan M. Olson, Disseminating Information About Laws: The Equal Ac-
cess to Justice Act (1990) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the
Law and Society Association, Berkeley, CA).
105. The unit of analysis is the dispute, not the court decision. Thus, if a case was heard at
more than one level of court, only the highest level court decision is coded. Similarly, if an
appellate decision consolidated several trial cases with different fact situations, the cases are
counted separately.
106. See Mezey & Olson, supra note 5.
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tion represent the prototypical EAJA case of a small business or licen-
see fending off regulatory enforcement. Cases such as motor vehicle
licensing proceedings are also included in this category. The category
of challenges to government valuations mostly consists of taxation
cases, though it also includes a handful of eminent domain and child
support cases. Challenges to government operations is the most eclec-
tic category. Its largest component is cases concerning public employ-
ment, but it also includes some concerning government contracts and
procedures such as forfeitures. Claims of rights/benefits are mainly
public assistance and unemployment claims, but also a few civil rights
or liberties cases. The final category, claims for regulatory enforce-
ment, is small but significant. These are cases in which a third party is
suing the government to get it to carry out some regulatory responsi-
bility. These cases are the antithesis of those emphasized by sponsors
of the federal and many state EAJAs, who viewed government regula-
tion as excessive.
Compared to their federal counterpart, use of the state EAJAs is
much more consistent with the deregulatory emphasis of the legisla-
tive history. Challenges to government regulation made up only 8.2%
of the federal EAJA cases, and claims for rights predominated with
60.5%.107 Use of the federal EAJA during the Eighties was domi-
nated heavily by claims against the Social Security Administration,
most from terminated disability recipients.'0 8 Among the state cases
in contrast, as Table 2 indicates, challenges to government regulation
are by far the largest type of claim (41%), with claims for rights/bene-
fits a distant second (22%), followed by challenges to government val-
uations (18%) and to government operations (15%). Claims for
regulatory enforcement are an even smaller percentage of state claims
(4%) than they were of federal claims (6%). This distribution of
claims suggests the state EAJAs more closely fulfill their sponsors'
intentions, of aiding resistance to government regulation, than the fed-
eral EAJA did in the Eighties.
Another dimension for analyzing the use of the state EAJAs is by
the type of party making the claim. Sponsors of EAJAs emphasized
the small business constituency, but they may not be the principal ben-
eficiaries of the statutes' redistributive effects once in operation. In-
deed, Mezey and Olson found use of the federal EAJA to have been
heavily dominated by individuals rather than businesses during the
107. Id. at 17 tbl. 2.
108. Id. at 17.
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Eighties because of the Social Security cases. Individuals brought
73.8% of the cases, compared to 11.3% brought by businesses. 109
With all state EAJAs together, cases involving individuals (48%)
slightly outnumber those involving businesses (45%) (Table 2). A few
claims involving associations (5%), local units of government (2%),
and unions (1%) have also arisen (Table 2). 110 A few states, however,
permit only businesses to make claims. If these states are excluded
(California, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Texas), then the per-
centages of cases involving the different types of parties are individu-
als (51%), businesses (40%), and others (8%). 111 Thus, individuals do
use state EAJAs more than businesses do, but the difference is not
nearly as great as under the federal EAJA.
If one could assume that cases brought by individuals are likely to
be smaller than those brought by organizations, these data would
weakly support Krent's claim that one-way fee shifting is especially
important for small claims that might otherwise be dwarfed by the
costs of pursuing them.1 2 There is some legitimacy to such an as-
sumption, but the assumption is quite unreliable. Individuals who are
licensees of the state (e.g., medical professionals, insurance agents,
etc.) are coded here as businesses because their disputes with the state
concern their occupation, and because they are eligible to bring claims
even in states in which only businesses and not individuals are eligi-
ble.1 13 Such "businesses" may have as meager resources as many
individuals.
The party data can shed somewhat more light on another of
Krent's theoretical expectations. Krent suggests that one-way fee
shifting is more needed for policy-implementation decisions than for
policy-making decisions because of greater opportunities for more di-
rect public oversight of the latter.1 4 To the extent that the vast major-
ity of the state EAJA cases address individual grievances with little
broader public interest, the EAJAs' use would be consistent with
Krent's expectations.
109. Id. at 16 tbl. 1.
110. Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number.
111. A few cases with individuals are coded for these five states because they also included
business parties or because individuals made claims but were rejected because they were not
eligible. The latter is especially true in Minnesota. The other four states that permit only busi-
nesses to make claims had no reported EAJA cases, and are excluded from Table 2.
112. Krent, supra note 46, at 465.
113. Public employees, in contrast, are coded as individuals.
114. Krent, supra note 46, at 462-63, 468-70.
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It was not possible to code each case as a policy-making or policy-
implementation decision without knowing a great deal about the sub-
stantive law at stake in each case, but a rough measure of broader
interest in a case is whether the cases are class actions or include inter-
est groups as either third parties or direct participants. In the entire
population of 355 cases, five are class actions and twenty-six more
cases include either one or more amici curiae, intervenors, or public
interest law firms representing the private party.115 In addition to
these cases, in nine more cases the associational plaintiffs were public
interest groups rather than narrower associations such as property
owners' groups. Thus, in about 11% of all the EAJA cases, there is
evidence of a broader public interest in the case. This suggests that
such groups clearly benefit from EAJAs, but by no means dominate
them, as some critics of one-way fee shifting have suggested. 116 Low-
visibility cases are the major beneficiaries of EAJAs, as Krent thinks
they should be.
Related to his distinction between policy-making and policy-im-
plementation cases is Krent's corresponding distinction between ac-
tions initiated by a private party and those initiated by the
government. Krent proposes that "fee shifting should encourage pri-
vate parties who are sued by the government to challenge vigorously
government policy."'1 17 This prospect surely was part of the congres-
sional intent for the federal EAJA, as evidenced by the allegations in
the legislative history that the government targets small businesses for
regulatory enforcement because they cannot afford to fight back. 1 8
From the facts as stated in the cases, I coded each case as initiated
by the government or the private party. For example, a private party
initiates an application for benefits, while the government initiates a
termination of benefits. Regulatory actions are usually initiated by
the government, unless a third party, such as a union, acts to compel
the government to enforce regulations. I coded tax cases as being ini-
tiated by the government, because the government determines that
the taxpayer erroneously calculated its tax liability. Generally, I iden-
tified the point of initiation as being earlier than the start of formal
legal action, in contrast to some states' narrower definitions. 119
115. Legal service agencies representing low-income persons or prisoners are not included in
these figures unless they appear as amicus curiae or are litigating the question of their own right
to receive attorney fee awards.
116. See Fein, supra note 13.
117. Krent, supra note 27, at 2049.
118. Cited in Krent, supra note 46, at 465-66, n.32.
119. See supra text accompanying note 77.
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Again, the empirical data seem consistent with Krent's theoreti-
cal analysis. Nationwide, 68% of state EAJA cases were initiated by
the government, and 32% by the private party (Table 2). To be accu-
rate, however, one should exclude the states that by statute include
only actions initiated by the government: Florida, Kentucky, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Texas. 120 Ironically, the pattern is the
same with these states omitted: 68% government-initiated and 32%
private-initiated. This is because the state-initiative rule has been sig-
nificantly litigated in Ohio and Pennsylvania, producing numerous
cases in which the parties are denied fees because they initiated the
controversy. By either measure, then, with more than twice as many
claims for fee shifts in cases initiated by the government than the re-
verse, the state EAJAs are performing the function Krent deems
appropriate.
The final theoretical variable Krent considers is the distinction
between monetary and nonmonetary cases. Krent states that awards
of attorney fees may be especially important for people with non-
monetary claims.121 The concept of the nonmonetary claim is not eas-
ily operationalized, however. It presumably includes affirmative
litigation for injunctive or declaratory relief rather than for money
damages, but certainly a party may seek to enjoin an action because of
its potential financial impact. Probably most litigation has some mon-
etary implications for the parties. For example, a professional facing
potential license revocation from a licensing board faces the entire
loss of livelihood, even though there is no ascertainable dollar amount
involved in the immediate proceedings.
For this study, "nonmonetary" is operationalized as being cases in
which the private party, if successful, would not directly receive
money from the losing side. The theoretical justification of this choice
is that persons who do receive money upon winning could use some of
it to pay an attorney.122 Cases are considered monetary even if the
party is seeking reimbursement of money previously paid, on the the-
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.111(3)(b) (West 1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 453.260(1) (Bald-
win 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2335.39(B)(1)(c), (B)(2) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 941 (West 1995); 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2033(a) (1995); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 2006.013 (West 1995). The Utah statute (UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27a-4, -5 (1995)) also covers
only government-initiated actions, but it produced no cases in Lexis.
121. Krent, supra note 27, at 2049; see also HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S MAKE A DEAL:
UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 101 (1991).
122. This definition of monetary, of course, ignores the magnitude of the payment. The case
of a person whose terminated public assistance benefits are restored is considered monetary as
much as that of a corporation that wins back millions of dollars in taxes, even though obviously
the latter has more resources with which to pay counsel.
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ory that even the majority of damage awards (the prototypical mone-
tary claim) are considered compensation for money lost or spent. Tax
and civil penalty cases are considered monetary on the assumption
that a party ordinarily has to pay the tax or penalty and then challenge
it, though I realize that is not always the case.
Using this definition, the state EAJAs do appear to be invoked in
more nonmonetary than monetary cases. Nationwide, 61% of the
cases involve nonmonetary claims, while only 38% involve monetary
claims (Table 2). The percentage of monetary cases is as high as it is
because of the large proportion of monetary cases (slightly over half)
in the state with by far the largest number of EAJA cases in total,
Arizona. The Arizona statute explicitly authorizes challenges to tax
assessments and will pay attorney fees at a higher rate in tax cases
than in other types of cases. 123 The underlying claims in the other
states in which monetary cases outnumber nonmonetary tend to be
either primarily regulatory cases with civil penalties (Pennsylvania) or
a handful of public benefit cases and back-pay actions (Nebraska).
Again, the state EAJAs appear to be attracting the very cases Krent
predicts they should.
C. Patterns of Fee Awards
The final important component of the data is the success rate.
Success rates measure the degree of redistribution that EAJAs actu-
ally accomplish. Moreover, they can have an iterative effect on the
use of a statute, as prospective claimants try to judge the likelihood of
succeeding before filing an EAJA claim. If prospective claimants are
aware that others have received awards, they presumably are more
likely to proceed with a claim.
The federal EAJA's redistributive effect during the Eighties ini-
tially appears to have been very different for different types of parties.
Individuals had a much higher success rate of 60%, compared to 28%
for businesses, but this was because of the Social Security disability
terminations, which courts widely held to be unlawful. 124 With Social
Security cases excluded, however, the average success rate was 36%,
with no statistically significant difference among types of parties. 25
123. ARM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(B), (E)(2) (1995).
124. Mezey & Olson, supra note 5, at 18, tbl. 4; see also SUSAN G. MEZEY, No LONGER
DISABLED: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLMCS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY (1988).
125. This figure is from unpublished data in the author's possession.
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For the state cases, EAJA claimants' overall success rate of 27%
(Table 2) is noticeably lower than the success rate under the federal
EAJA. 126 A more accurate comparison with the federal law, however,
would include only those states with standards for recovery similar to
the federal "substantial justification" standard, which would exclude
Arizona, Montana, and Texas. 127 If these three states are excluded,
claimants' success rate in the other states drops from 29% to 26%
(excluding remands, awards under other statutes, and missing data).
Thus, the state courts as a whole are less generous in granting EAJA
claims under the "substantially justified" standard than the federal
courts, even in non-Social Security cases. 128
The standard of recovery explains some, but not all, of the differ-
ence in success rates across states. The two states with the stricter,
"bad faith" standard for recovery have among the lowest success
rates: one successful case out of eleven in Montana; and only one case,
unsuccessful, in Texas. On the other hand, the success rate in some
states using the substantially justified standard is similarly low: no
successes among six cases in Louisiana, one out of nine in Missouri,
and two out of seventeen in Ohio.
At the upper end, three states using the substantial justification
standard have success rates (remands excluded) equaling or exceeding
50%-Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia, 129 and two more exceed
40% (South Carolina and Wisconsin). The interesting case is Arizona,
the one state without even a substantial justification standard and with
by far the largest number of claims. Its success rate of 44% is well
above average, but still more than half of claimants fail to receive fee
awards. Apparently the Arizona courts have chosen to interpret other
restrictions in the law as strictly as possible, perhaps to protect the
public treasury from paying too many attorney fee awards. 130 The
126. The remand rate is slightly higher for state cases (6%) than for federal cases (5%).
Subsequent state success rates presented here are calculated without remands, awards under
other statutes, and missing data. Cases receiving any award were coded "yes," even if it was only
a partial award.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 88-91.
128. In contrast, state courts show less deference to agencies on the merits than do federal
courts to federal agencies, according to a rare empirical study of judicial review of state agencies.
See Stephen I. Frank, State Supreme Courts and Administrative Agencies, 51 STATE GOV'T 119
(1978); Stephen Frank, The Oversight of Administrative Agencies by State Supreme Courts: Some
Macro Findings, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 477 (1980).
129. Virginia phrases its standard as reasonableness rather than substantial justification. VA.
CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:21 (Michie 1995).
130. The Arizona statute (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-348(H) (1995)) denies an award in
cases where the government was a nominal party or adjudicated a dispute or issue between
private parties, and in a few other types of actions. Other conditions, under which the court is
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lack of a "substantially justified" standard (or other similar one) ap-
pears to have a greater effect on the number of claims than on those
claims' success. 131
In addition to differences in success by state or standard of recov-
ery, there are modest differences among types of parties and types of
claims, and between cases with monetary or nonmonetary stakes.
Although the legislatures mostly had businesses in mind when they
passed the laws, individuals not only brought more cases, but also won
at a somewhat higher rate. Excluding the states that permit only busi-
nesses to make claims, fees were awarded in 33% of cases brought by
individuals, compared to 28% of business cases and 16% of cases by
other parties. 132
These differences may be due largely to the types of claims
brought by different types of parties. Sixty percent of the cases
brought by businesses were challenges to government regulations, just
as the legislators intended, while only 23% of cases brought by indi-
viduals were of this type. In contrast, only 4% of business cases, but
41% of individual cases, were claims of rights (largely related to pub-
lic entitlement programs). Thirty-six percent of cases involving claims
of rights received fee awards, while only 27% of challenges to govern-
ment regulations received awards, even though they are the type of
case original EAJA supporters most had in mind. The discrepancy
between awards to businesses and to individuals is no greater than it is
because challenges to government valuations (largely tax claims) re-
ceived fee awards 37% of the time, and businesses brought 68% of
this type of claim.
With respect to the types of cases Krent expected to be most
helped by one-way fee shifting, the picture is mixed. Although cases
with nonmonetary stakes produced a majority of claims, cases with
monetary stakes received awards at a higher rate (34%) than did non-
monetary cases (26%). The number of nonmonetary claims is suffi-
ciently greater, however, that 55% of cases receiving fee awards are
nonmonetary claims.133 The other category Krent expected to be
statutorily authorized to reduce or deny the award, are if the prevailing party protracted the
litigation, if the reason for prevailing is an intervening change in the applicable law, or if the
prevailing party refused a settlement offer at least as favorable as the relief granted. Many of
these conditions appear in other state EAJAs as well.
131. If the Arizona statute did not exclude monetary benefit claims, it no doubt would gener-
ate yet many more cases, since this claim type is common in some other states.
132. Levels of statistical significance are not reported for these and the following associations
because the data are not from a random sample; they consist of all reported cases under state
EAJAs.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 121-23.
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helped, cases initiated by the government, received 69% of the fee
awards granted because they were more numerous than cases initiated
by the private party and had a success rate virtually the same (30.5%)
as those initiated by the private party (29.5%).134
In summary, the state EAJAs have generally attracted the types
of cases that the legislators anticipated; more so than has the federal
EAJA. There is no one type of state case that has dominated state
EAJAs as Social Security claims have dominated the federal EAJA.
Moreover, the state EAJAs have also generally attracted the types of
cases that Krent theoretically predicted that the Acts should. These
patterns of use occur despite patterns of fee awards that do not rein-
force the use patterns. The most expected types of cases generally win
fee awards at rates equal to, or lower than, cases with monetary
stakes, cases initiated by private parties, cases brought by individuals,
and cases challenging the government for reasons other than to resist
regulations. The differences are generally not large, however, and
these conclusions are limited to reported, primarily appellate, cases.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This review of the use of state Equal Access to Justice Acts shows
how laws often take on a life of their own that may be somewhat dif-
ferent from their sponsors' vision. A flurry of state EAJAs were
passed in the wake of the federal EAJA, which clearly reflected an-
tigovernment ideology and was seen initially as a benefit for small
business owners. In at least some states, it is also evident that business
was the primary intended constituency. Nonetheless, most of the stat-
utes were written more broadly, which is entirely appropriate from the
perspective of the public-regarding goals of one-way fee shifting.' 35
Businesses are not unique in having disputes with the government,
and the need to equalize resources for litigation applies to other par-
ties at least as much as to businesses.
Because of the flood of Social Security disability cases, use of the
federal EAJA deviated dramatically from that anticipated by its origi-
nal supporters. 136 The state EAJAs, however, are by no means redis-
134. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20. States permitting only government-initiated
cases were excluded from this calculation.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
136. Mezey & Olson, supra note 5. It is possible that the pattern of use Mezey and Olson
found of the federal EAJA may be peculiar to the particular time period they studied, but the
proportion of federal EAJA claims arising from Social Security cases stayed very high at least
through the 1989-90 year studied by Krent, supra note 46, at 485.
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tributive mechanisms that award attorney fees primarily to those with
the fewest resources. As noted, some statutes permit only businesses
to make claims. Although the eligibility limits in many of the laws are
intended to ensure that the wealthiest claimants do not benefit, these
eligibility limits vary dramatically, and thirteen states have no such
limits at all. Some exclude the kinds of cases most likely brought by
low-income people: claims under public benefit programs. Others ac-
cord favored treatment to challenges of tax assessments, which bene-
fits most those with the highest taxes.
As measured by actual use rather than the features of the stat-
utes, at best only half of EAJA claimants in any state receive a fee
award, and the national average is merely 27% (Table 2). More indi-
viduals than businesses make EAJA claims, where they are permitted
to, and receive awards, but the distinction between individuals and
businesses is too imprecise a measure to draw substantial conclusions
about who benefits most from EAJAs. Claims for fee awards arise in
a wide variety of cases. A substantially higher percentage of them
occur in challenges to government regulation under state EAJAs than
under the federal EAJA, which suggests that the usage pattern of the
state laws is somewhat more consistent with the deregulatory ideology
they share.137 Although the success rate in these cases is not as high
as in claims of rights, which probably benefit mainly lower-income
people, the latter's success rates are matched by those in tax cases
(and other challenges to government valuations), over two-thirds of
which are brought by businesses.
Some critics have worried that one-way fee shifts have primarily
benefited public interest groups. 138 There is no evidence from state
EAJA data to support this conclusion. Not only do merely 11% of
cases include parties indicative of wider public interest in a case, 139 but
also the only type of case in which associations, unions, and govern-
mental bodies predominate is the smallest and least successful. Cases
seeking to compel the government to enforce regulations are virtually
the opposite of the type of case most EAJA sponsors envisioned and
that 60% of these cases involve associations, unions, or governmental
bodies. Such cases make up only 4% of all state EAJA claims, how-
ever, and they win fee awards at the lowest rate: only 7%. Thus, only
1% of fee awards occur in regulatory enforcement cases.
137. See Mezey & Olson, supra note 5, at 18, tbl. 2.
138. Fein, supra note 13.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16.
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If one can generalize, then, about state EAJAs with so many vari-
ations among them, one would note that the beneficiaries of the
EAJAs' redistributive effects are spread broadly across the popula-
tions, and across issues with which state governments are involved.
Their redistributive effects are limited, however, no doubt in part due
to the nearly universally used "substantial justification" or "reason-
able basis" standards for recovery. The Arizona fee statute's lack of
such a standard shows its importance in deterring claims, but the Ari-
zona example also shows that other features of a statute can be used
to limit awards and the risk of excessive litigation.
The "substantially justified" standard of recovery could be seen
as striking a balance between antigovernment and antilitigation ideol-
ogies. The EAJAs provide some recourse against government action,
but do not make a fee award so easy to get that they create a strong
incentive to litigate where there would not be one otherwise. In fact,
as a means to prevent overdeterrence of necessary government ac-
tion, the substantially justified standard was a product more of direct
opposition to the antigovernment ideology and of budgetary concerns
than of antilitigation ideology. Furthermore, in operation, the stan-
dard has certainly not been a litigation-deterring mechanism. The fed-
eral EAJA has generated significant secondary litigation over the
issue of what constitutes substantial justification. 140 Adherents to the
antilitigation ideology should support Krent's argument that the "sub-
stantially justified" standard could be dropped and prevailing parties
automatically receive fees without risk of overdeterrence in many ar-
eas in which the government is protected by a deferential standard of
review.141
Finally, although this study provides a first look at the impact of
state EAJAs, much more empirical research is needed to test theoreti-
cal predictions about the effects of fee shifting. Within the limits of
the data and the measures available, the patterns of use of the state
EAJAs appear to be quite consistent with the types of cases in which
Krent used economic theory to predict EAJAs would be most useful.
Cases with nonmonetary stakes and cases initiated by the government
received more fee awards than either cases with monetary stakes or
those initiated by private parties. One needs to know at least the un-
derlying number of potentially eligible cases under a fee statute to be
able to draw firmer conclusions. Ideally, a controlled comparison of
140. Krent, supra note 46, at 479; see also Blackman, supra note 98.
141. Krent, supra note 46, at 475-76.
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similar litigation under one-way fee shifting and the American rule is
necessary to determine if fee shifting is having much effect.
This study also has implications for the theoretical literature on
fee shifting. This literature needs to give more attention to one-way
fee-shifting statutes because of their prevalence in this country. Fur-
thermore, the study of EAJAs suggests an additional dependent varia-
ble that is not often addressed in this literature: the decision whether
to claim fees if the party is eligible to do so. Presumably this variable
has been ignored because the literature usually compares the Ameri-
can rule to the British rule, where fee shifting to the prevailing party is
automatic. In contrast, under EAJAs and many other American fee-
shifting statutes, parties must petition to receive fees. The low utiliza-
tion of the federal EAJA (compared to the estimates made at the time
of its passage 142), and the seemingly low number of claims under the
state EAJAs in the years they have been in effect suggest that claim-
ing fees when eligible should not be taken for granted. Persons may
not be aware of available fee-shifting statutes, especially not at the
stage when they are only considering whether to consult counsel. 143
Only when we have more controlled, empirical studies of litiga-
tion under different fee arrangements will we even be able to begin to
weigh the competing ideologies and address the ultimate normative
question of whether fee shifting facilitates "meritorious" litigation and
deters "frivolous" litigation. Public policy made on the basis of mere
assumptions about these matters is risky and short-sighted.
142. Mezey & Olson, supra note 5, at 19.
143. The persistence of high proportions of federal EAJA claims from Social Security cases
after the roll-back of the Reagan administration's policy of reducing disability payments suggests
that once a certain type of party (or, more accurately, the network of attorneys that serve them)
discovers an EAJA, such parties will continue to use it.
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